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Financial Contracts and the New Bankruptcy Code:
Insulating Markets from Bankrupt Debtors and Bankruptcy Judges
Edward R. Morrison† and Joerg Riegel‡

Abstract
The reforms of 2005 yield important but subtle changes in the Bankruptcy
Code’s treatment of financial contracts. They might appear only to
eliminate longstanding uncertainty surrounding the protections available to
financial contract counterparties, especially counterparties to repurchase
transactions and other derivative contracts. But the ambit of the reforms is
much broader. The expanded definitions—especially the definition of
“swap agreement”—are now so broad that nearly every derivative contract
is subject to the Code’s protection. Instead of protecting particular
counterparties to particular transactions, the Code now protects any
counterparty to any derivative contract. Entire markets have been insulated
from the costs of a bankruptcy filing by a financial contract counterparty.
Equally important, the amendments limit judicial discretion to assess the
economic substance of financial transactions, even those that resemble
ordinary loans or that retire a debtor’s outstanding debt or equity. The
reforms of 2005 direct judges to apply a formalistic inquiry based on
industry custom: a financial transaction is a “swap,” “repurchase
transaction,” or other protected transaction if it is treated as such in the
relevant financial market. The transaction’s loan‐like features or its effect on
outstanding obligations of the debtor are irrelevant, unless they affect the
transaction’s characterization in financial markets. Absent fraud, form
trumps substance—a desirable outcome, we argue, in light of the
impossibility of drawing coherent lines between combinations of ordinary
financial contracts and loans, dividends, or debt repurchases.
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Introduction
Financial contracts have long received special treatment under the
Bankruptcy Code. Core provisions—the automatic stay,1 limitations on
preferential2 and fraudulent transfers,3 and nullification of ipso facto clauses4—
have limited application to most parties to swaps, forwards, securities contracts,
and other types of financial products. When a debtor becomes insolvent or enters
bankruptcy, counterparties are free to terminate agreements, liquidate positions,
and set off claims against margin or other collateral posted by the debtor.5 Parties
to some contracts (such as forwards) enjoyed these rights as early as the original
1978 Code.6 Parties to other contracts had to wait for amendments in the early
1980s, in 1990,7 or, most recently, in Title IX of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention
and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“Act” or “Reform Act”).8
These exceptions or “safe harbors” are necessary, it is thought,9 for the
protection of financial markets, including over‐the‐counter (“OTC”) markets on
which most derivative contracts are executed. Without these safe harbors,
markets might suffer serious shocks—perhaps even a systemic liquidity crisis,
causing markets to collapse—when debtors enter bankruptcy. Counterparties to
financial contracts would find themselves subject to the automatic stay for
extended periods. They would be unable to liquidate volatile contracts and
thereby limit their exposure to market movements.10 Additionally, a debtor in
bankruptcy would be free to “cherrypick” multiple contracts with the same
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”), Pub. L. No.
109‐8, §§ 1, et seq., 119 Stat. 23, et seq. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)); 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)
(2000).
2 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109‐8, §§ 1, et seq., 119 Stat. 23, et seq. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 547(b));
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000).
3 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109‐8, §§ 1, et seq., 119 Stat. 23, et seq (to be codified in 11 U.S.C §§ 544(b),
548); 11 U.S.C §§ 544(b), 548 (2000).
4 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109‐8, §§ 1, et seq., 119 Stat. 23, et seq. (to be codified in 11 U.S.C. § 365(e));
11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2000).
5 See infra Part I.A.
6 See infra notes 22–25 and accompanying text.
7 Id.
8 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109‐8, §§ 401–47, 119 Stat. 146–85 (to be codified as amended in scattered
sections of Title 11 of the United States Code).
9 See Frank R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy Code: Why the Special
Treatment?, 22 YALE J. REG. 92, 94 (2005) (noting Congressional and academic reliance on
argument).
10 William J. Bergman et al., Netting, Financial Contracts, and Banks: The Economic Implications 31–32
(Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago, Working Paper No. 2004‐02, 2003), available at http://papers.ssrn.com
(search author “Bergmann”).
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party.11 Instead of netting the contracts—i.e., setting‐off losses under some
contracts against gains under others with the same counterparty—the debtor could
dispose of the contracts independently. “In‐the‐money” contracts could be
assumed; “out‐of‐the‐money” contracts could be rejected. In this way, the debtor
could lock‐in gains on profitable contracts and (due to its insolvency) limit
liability for losses under unprofitable ones. The counterparty to these contracts
would find itself paying in full on the assumed contracts and receiving only a
fraction of its claim on the rejected. Losses from indefinite exposure to market
movements and from cherrypicking could produce financial distress in the
counterparty itself,12 forcing it to default on its own contracts with other parties.
As one distressed party infects another, a domino effect could ensue,
undermining the entire financial market.13
This theory was cited repeatedly14 as Congress acted in 2005 to expand the
range of protections available to financial contract counterparties.15 Prior to the
Reform Act, nontrivial uncertainty surrounded the range of transactions and
contractual rights covered by the Code’s exceptions and the types of parties
eligible to take advantage of those exceptions. As we show in Part I, the Act goes
a long way toward eliminating this uncertainty by dramatically expanding the
range of financial contracts (especially repos, swaps, and margin loans),
counterparties, and contractual rights (especially cross‐product netting) that
receive protection under the Code.16 The expansion is particularly striking for
derivative contracts, such as forwards, futures, swaps, and options. Prior to 2005,
the Code’s protections were broad for swaps (any counterparty received
protection) and narrow for other derivative contracts (only some counterparties
were protected).17 The Act obliterates this asymmetry, principally by redefining

See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 9, at 95–96 (explaining the “cherrypicking” power in
greater detail).
12 Id. at 97–98, 101–02.
13 Id. at 101–03.
14 See H.R. REP. NO. 109‐31 at 3, 20, 131, 132 (2005) (justifying amendments to Code as “provisions
designed to reduce systemic risk”).
15 This theory, however, appears to have little empirical support. See, e.g., Edwards & Morrison,
supra note 9, at 99–106 (arguing Code can do little to reduce systemic risk and may instead
exacerbate it).
16 Similar reforms were made to provisions governing the insolvency of depository institutions.
See BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109‐8, §§ 901–06, 908–09, 119 Stat. 23, 146–70, 183–84 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of Title 11 of United States Code).
17 See infra notes 41–43 and accompanying text.
11
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“swap” to include, effectively, all derivative contracts.18 In so doing, the Code has
moved from protecting particular parties to protecting entire markets.
The new Code achieves this market protection through broad‐ranging
definitions of protected transactions and contractual rights. With broad
definitions come line‐drawing problems, of course. The definitions, for example,
now encompass many transactions that, singly or in combination, have distinct
loan‐like elements.19 Examples include repos, total return swaps combined with
stock purchases, and combinations of prepaid and postpaid forwards. When
does a transaction’s credit component become sufficiently important that the
transaction falls outside the range of protected financial transactions?
Another puzzle arises from the Code’s protections for “settlement
payments” by or to protected parties, including payments made a few days
before the debtor’s bankruptcy filing.20 Does this protection encompass payments
to the debtor’s own equityholders and bondholders? Examples include leveraged
buyout payments (“LBO”) to shareholders and settlement payments to
bondholders under debt repurchases. Should bankruptcy judges prevent the
Code’s financial contracts provisions from sheltering what would otherwise
amount to constructively fraudulent or preferential transfers?
We address these questions in Part II and show that the answers are left,
in large part, to the marketplace. The Code’s definitions are based exclusively on
market definitions. A transaction is protected if, in the judgment of market
participants, it falls within a category of transactions included in the Code and
recognized in the marketplace. A payment is protected if a market participant
would call it a settlement payment. Instead of asking judges to assess the
economics of a transaction and distinguish “true” financial contracts from
“shams,” the Code asks judges to rely on industry custom.
Indeed, if anything is clear from the new Code, it is that judges are
strongly discouraged from engaging in functional analysis of financial contracts.
The Code’s protections encompass contracts or combinations of contracts that
differ little in substance from unprotected transactions, such as secured loans.
They are protected because they are recognized in financial markets as financial
contracts. Any judicial effort to distinguish protected and unprotected contracts
based on their “substance” is doomed to failure and can only generate significant
See infra notes 62–75 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.A.
20 See infra Part II.B.
18
19
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uncertainty in the very markets the Code seeks to protect. By relying on broad
market definitions, the Act gets judges out of the (largely futile) business of
second‐guessing financial contracts. Absent evidence of intent to defraud a
debtor’s creditors, which remains ground for denying protection to payments
under a financial contract, the new role of judges is to apply industry custom to
financial contracts in much the same way that they would apply custom to
interpret a contract under the Uniform Commercial Code.21
I.

The Code’s New Bright Lines

The Reform Act might seem to perform a modest function, tying up loose
ends created by multiple, somewhat inconsistent amendments to the Code over
the past 25 years. Starting with commodity and forward contracts, which
received protection under the original 1978 Code,22 Congress added protection
for securities contracts in 1982,23 repurchase agreements in 1984,24 and swaps in
1990.25 For each transaction, Congress specified—separately and in terms that
have varied over time—protections available to counterparties. This patchwork
approach to the Code generated some confusion, particularly about the scope of
protected transactions and the range of protections available to counterparties.
Moreover, although the various amendments addressed similar (and sometimes
identical) transactions, the amendments did not refer to each other, raising
difficult statutory interpretation questions.
Title IX of the Reform Act remedies most of these problems and, in doing
so, might seem to perform a modest housekeeping function. But Title IX is hardly
modest, for it marks a large shift in the structure of exemptions for derivative
contracts: instead of protecting particular parties, the Code now protects entire
markets.

See U.C.C. §§ 1‐102, 1‐103 (2005). See generally Lisa Bernstein, Private Commercial Law in the
Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperating Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions, 99 MICH. L. REV. 1724,
1735 (2001) (“Broadly speaking, the Code directs courts to look to immanent business norms
reflected in course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of trade, to fill gaps and interpret
contracts . . . .”).
22 See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95‐598, §§ 362(b)(6), 548(d)(2)(B), 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. (92 Stat.) 2549.
23 Act of July 27, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97‐222, §§ 1, et seq., 96 Stat. 235 (codified as amended at various
provisions of Title 11 of the United States Code).
24 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98‐353, §§ 391, et seq.,
98 Stat. 333, (codified as amended at various provisions of Title 11 of the United States Code).
25 Act of June 25, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101‐311, §§ 101, et seq., 104 Stat. 267 (codified as amended at
various provisions of Title 11 of the United States Code).
21
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A. The Original Structure: Incomplete Market Protection
The broad outlines of the Code remain unchanged after the Reform Act.
Parties to five basic categories of financial contracts—repurchase agreements,
commodity contracts, forward contracts, swap agreements, and securities
contracts—enjoy a limited exception from the Code’s automatic stay, its
prohibition on ipso facto clauses in executory contracts, and its preference and
fraudulent conveyance rules.
Many contracts (financial and nonfinancial) enable a counterparty to
terminate or modify the contract if the debtor suffers distress or enters
bankruptcy (an example is a clause accelerating the debtor’s obligations in the
event of insolvency). The contract may also allow the counterparty to seize
collateral and exercise setoff rights. These setoff rights allow the counterparty to
subtract its liabilities to the debtor from its claims against the debtor, thereby
reducing its claims against the debtor (and its exposure to nonpayment).
Generally, these contractual rights are limited when a debtor enters
bankruptcy. Section 365(e) nullifies contractual provisions, including acceleration
and termination clauses, which alter the debtor’s rights in the event of financial
distress.26 Similarly, the automatic stay of section 362 restricts attempts to seize
collateral or exercise setoff rights.27 Moreover, a debtor’s eve‐of‐bankruptcy
payments to a counterparty may run afoul of the Code’s preference28 and
fraudulent conveyance rules.29
These limits on counterparty rights, however, do not apply when the
underlying contract is a financial contract and the counterparty is a “protected
party.” Protected parties enjoy the same rights in bankruptcy as they do outside.
They are free to close‐out the agreement, exercise certain setoff rights, and
foreclose on margin—before or after the debtor enters bankruptcy. The Code
calls off the automatic stay,30 prohibition on ipso facto clauses, 31 and its

11 U.S.C. § 365(e) (2000).
BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109‐8, §§ 1, et seq., 119 Stat. 23, et seq. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
362(a)); 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2000).
28 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109‐8, §§ 1, et seq., 119 Stat. 23, et seq. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 547);
11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (2000).
29 BAPCPA, Pub. L. No. 109‐8, §§ 1, et seq., 119 Stat. 23, et seq. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 544(b),
548); 11 U.S.C. §§ 544(b), 548 (2000).
30 BAPCPA §§ 907(d)(1)(A), (o)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6)) (permitting setoff,
notwithstanding automatic stay, by certain counterparties to commodity, forward, and securities
contracts); id. at §§ 907(d)(1)(B), (o)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(7)) (creating similar safe
26
27
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preference and constructive fraudulent conveyance rules.32 These protections are
available to any counterparty to a swap or repurchase agreement. Counterparties
to other protected financial contracts—forward, commodity, and securities
contracts—received more limited protections prior to the Reform Act. Under the
old Code, exemptions from the automatic stay and the limitation on ipso‐facto
clauses were available only to brokers, forward contract merchants, banks, and
certain other protected entities.33 Along the same lines, exemptions from the
preference and fraudulent transfer rules were available to any counterparty,
provided the transfer was made by or to one of those protected entities.34
This statutory scheme sounds fairly simple, but the simplicity depends
critically on the clarity of its definitions. And the definitions—of protected
transactions, parties, and contractual rights—have not been easy to apply,
particularly with respect to the innovative financial transactions developed
during the past 15 years.
The definitions of protected transactions have been particularly troubling.
The definition of “swap agreement,” for example, became part of the Code in
1990 and set out a non‐exhaustive list of swap‐like transactions—rate, basis,
harbor for repo participants); id. at § 907(d)(1)(C) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17))
(creating similar safe harbor for swap participants).
31 BAPCPA §§ 907(g), (o)(7), (p)(1)(A) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 555) (exempting ipso facto
clauses in securities contracts); id. at §§ 907(h), (o)(8), (p)(1)(A) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 556)
(exempting ipso facto clauses in commodity and forward contracts); id. at §§ 907(i), (o)(9),
(p)(1)(B) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 559) (exempting ipso facto clauses in repurchase
agreements); id. at §§ 907(j), (o)(10), (p)(1)(B) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 560) (exempting ipso
facto clauses in swaps).
32 BAPCPA § 907(o)(3) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 546(e)) (declaring that, unless payment was
fraudulent transfer under § 548(a)(1)(A), trustee cannot use its powers under §§ 544, 545, 547,
548(a)(1)(B), and 548(b) to avoid margin or settlement payments by or to protected parties to
commodity, forward, and securities contracts prior to case commencement); id. at § 907 (o)(2) (to
be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 546(f)) (offering same safe harbor for margin or settlement payments in
connection with repurchase agreements); id. at §§ 406(1), 907(e)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
546(g)) (offering same safe harbor for transfers under or in connection with swap agreements).
33 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) (2000) (making exemption from automatic stay available to “a
commodity broker, forward contract merchant, stockbroker,” and other specified parties to
forward, commodity, and securities contracts); id. at § 555 (making exemption from prohibition
on ipso facto clauses available to particular parties to securities contracts), id. at § 556 (making
same exemption available to particular parties to commodity and forward contracts).
34 11 U.S.C. § 546(e) (2000); see also In re Kaiser Steel Corp., 952 F.2d 1230, 1241 (10th Cir. 1991)
(protecting payments under securities contract to shareholder, even though shareholder was not
protected party under section 546(e), because payments were made by stockbroker, clearing
agency, or financial institution).
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commodity, currency, and cross‐currency rate swaps; interest rate and currency
options; rate caps, floors, and collars; and “any other similar agreement.”35 None
of these transactions was defined by the Code; a judge was presumably expected
to rely on standard market definitions.36 Although flexible and seemingly
exhaustive in scope,37 the “swap agreement” definition proved worrisome
because it had to be stretched to cover equity swaps, credit default swaps, total
return swaps, weather derivatives, and other transactions that became
increasingly popular in the 1990s.
The definitions of protected contractual rights have been equally
problematic. The problem stemmed largely from the structure of the Code,
which described the protected rights separately for each type of financial
contract. Section 362(b)(6) protected contractual setoff rights with respect to
commodity, forward, and securities contracts, section 362(b)(7) did the same for
repurchase agreements, and 362(b)(17) did it for swaps.38 By explicitly protecting
setoff rights within groups of financial products, was the Code implicitly limiting
the exercise of contractual setoff rights across groups of products?39 A limit on
cross‐product netting across groups of financial contracts would make
counterparties vulnerable to the financial distress of debtors, a result which

11 U.S.C. § 101(53B) (2000).
And this is what judges have done:
By way of guidance in ascertaining the meaning of “settlement payment,” as the
term relates to both § 546(e) and companion provisions in § 546(f), Congress
made clear that the provisions are to be defined with reference to the common
understanding, practice and usage in the securities industry. . . . Further
reflecting actual industry practice and definitional understanding, the
Bankruptcy Code expressly extends its reach to cover several particular kinds of
financial transactions which rely upon the concept of settlement payments.
Jackson v. Mishkin (In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 263 B.R. 406, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); see
also Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Savs. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1042–43 (9th Cir.
2002) (relying on expert opinion to define interest rate swaps); In re Interbulk, 240 B.R. 195, 200–
01 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (utilizing market definitions of “swap agreement”).
37 Allen & Overy Memorandum on U.S. Netting Legislation for ISDA, at 2 (April 2, 2001), available
at www.isda.org/speeches/pdf/Memorandum_for_ISDA‐US‐Netting‐Legislation.pdf (explaining
how market definition encompassed “known universe of privately negotiated derivatives at the
time”).
38 See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
39 See Allen & Overy Memorandum on U.S. Netting Legislation, supra note 37, at 2 (noting
uncertainty surrounding this question).
35
36
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seems inconsistent with the Code’s goal of reducing systemic risk in financial
markets.40
Finally, the definitions of protected parties led to an asymmetry between
swaps and repurchase agreements, on one hand, and forward, commodity, and
securities contracts, on the other. Any swap or repurchase agreement
counterparty41 enjoyed the Code’s protections, but only some counterparties to
the other contracts could say the same.42 As a result, a pension fund or oil
company might find itself protected with respect to swaps but unprotected with
respect to forwards with the very same party.43
B. The New Code: Protecting Markets
The Reform Act radically reworks the Code’s definitions, expanding them
to cover a broad range of transactions that are or become common in financial
markets. One of the more important changes (more on this below) is contained in
the definition of “swap agreement.”44 In its new form, essentially all derivatives
have become “swap agreements;” all parties to them, and all transfers under or
in connection with them, enjoy the Code’s protections.45 For derivatives, at least,

Prior to the Reform Act, practitioners were also unsure whether the Code protected a
counterparty’s rights under arrangements adjunct to the transaction itself, such as a security
agreement. Arguably it did. Section 362(b) created a safe harbor for the exercise of setoff rights
“under or in connection with” a financial contract. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), (7), (17) (2000) (emphasis
added).
41 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 101(53C) (2000) (defining “swap participant” as “entity that, at any time
before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding swap agreement with the debtor”); id. at §
362(b)(17) (offering “swap participants” exemption from automatic stay).
42 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(6) (2000) (offering exemption from automatic stay only to
commodity brokers, forward contract merchants, stockbrokers, financial institutions, and certain
other counterparties to commodity, forward, and securities contracts).
43 A similar argument was pressed by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc.
(ISDA) and the Public Securities Association (“PSA,” now known as the Bond Market
Association) in a joint position paper, which proposed legislation that, for the most part, became
the text of the Reform Act. See ISDA AND PSA ON FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS IN INSOLVENCY:
REDUCING LEGAL RISK THROUGH LEGISLATIVE REFORM (1996), at 8, http://www.isda.org/
speeches/pdf/FinancialTransinInsolvency.pdf.
44 See H.R. REP NO. 109‐31, supra note 14, at 128 (describing amendment as an “update [of] the
statutory definition [that will] achieve contractual netting across economically similar
transactions”).
45 The breadth of the new swap agreement definition is acknowledged in the Act’s legislative
history. Id. at 129 (“The use of the term ‘forward’ in the definition of ‘swap agreement’ is not
intended to refer only to transactions that fall within the definition of ‘forward contract.’ Instead,
a ‘forward’ transaction could be a ‘swap agreement’ even if not a ‘forward contract.’”).
40
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the Act now offers financial market protection, a significant departure from the old
paradigm of protection for particular parties.
In principle, the Act retains the five basic categories of protected
transactions—securities contracts, swaps, repurchase agreements, forwards, and
commodity contracts. The definition of each transaction is restructured and
updated. Every definition now begins with a description of the product itself and
then lists various related transactions, such as contracts that combine several
versions of the product, options to enter into the product, and master agreements
or security agreements involving the product.46 The description of the product
itself defers to industry definitions, as before, but now includes an expanded list
of products that are actively traded in organized or OTC markets. The number of
listed transactions has increased significantly for swap agreements, securities
contracts, and repurchase agreements.47 Forward and commodity contracts are
given less dramatic face‐lifts. Equally important, most definitions now include an
“opening clause,” which extends the Code’s protection to any transaction that is
“similar” to one listed in the definition itself.48
See BAPCPA § 907(a)(1)(A) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)) (defining forward contract); id.
at § 907(a)(1)(C) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)) (defining repurchase agreement); id. at §
907(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B)) (defining swap agreement); id. at § 907(a)(2)
(to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)) (defining securities contract); id. at § 907(a)(3) (to be codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 761(4)) (defining commodity contract); see also H.R. REP NO. 109‐31, supra note 14, at
129 (explaining that protected transactions include “any security agreement or arrangement, or
other credit enhancement, related to a” protected transaction).
47 One particularly noteworthy addition includes “margin loans” as one of the categories of
“securities contracts.” Also expressly included are “repurchase or reverse repurchase
transactions.” Compare 11 U.S.C. § 741(7) (2000), with BAPCPA § 907(a) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C.
§ 741(7)(A)(i), (iv)).
48 Opening clauses are added to the definitions of securities contracts, commodity contracts, and
forward contracts. See BAPCPA § 907(a)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(v)) (amending
definition of securities contract to include “any other agreement or transaction that is similar to
an agreement or transaction referred to in this subparagraph”); id. at § 907(a)(3)(B) (to be codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 761(4)(F)) (amending definition of commodity contracts in same manner); id. at §
907(a)(1)(A) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(A)) (amending definition of “forward contract”
to include “any other similar agreement”). The preexisting opening clause for swaps, 11 U.S.C.
101(53B)(A) (2000) (encompassing “any other similar agreement”), was modified to include “any
agreement or transaction that is similar to any other agreement or transaction referred to in this
paragraph and that” has been, is now, or becomes the “subject of recurrent dealings in the swap
markets” and is a “forward, swap, future,” or other listed transaction. BAPCPA § 907(a)(1)(E) (to
be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B)(A)(ii)). The legislative history explains that “the definition of
‘swap agreement’ was originally intended to provide sufficient flexibility to avoid the need to
amend the definition as the nature and uses of swap transactions matured. To that end, the
phrase ‘or any other similar agreement’ was included in the definition. (The phrase ‘or any
46
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The definition of “securities contract” is instructive. Prior to 2005, it
covered any “contract for the purchase, sale, or loan of a security, certificate of
deposit, or group or index of securities.”49 In the new Code, that definition is
replaced with a laundry list: a “securities contract” is “a contract for the
purchase, sale, or loan of a security, a certificate of deposit, a mortgage loan or
any interest in a mortgage loan, a group or index of securities, certificates of
deposit, or mortgage loans or interests therein, … any option on any of the
foregoing, … any repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction …, any margin
loan,” and several other transactions.50 Among the elements of this list, the
express protection of “repurchase and reverse repurchase transactions” is of
particular importance, as we explain in Part II.A below. Significantly, a
“securities contract” also includes “any other agreement or transaction that is
similar to an agreement or transaction referred to in this subparagraph.”51 Little
is left to the imagination; we need only look to the marketplace now or in the
future to determine what constitutes a “securities contract.”
In addition to enlarging the five basic categories of financial transactions,
the Act creates a new super‐category, the “master netting agreement,” which is a
contract that sets out rights of termination, acceleration, and setoff within and
across multiple financial transactions within a single contract.52 The primary effect
of adding this new category is to expand the range of protected contractual rights.
Under new sections 362(b)(27), 546(j), 548(d)(2)(E), and 561,53 these rights—
including cross‐product netting54—are now protected across all financial
contracts, if exercised under a master netting agreement.55 Recall that cross‐
product netting enjoyed an uneasy legal status prior to 2005.56

similar agreement’ has been added to the definitions of ‘forward contract,’ ‘commodity contract,’
‘repurchase agreement’ [sic] and ‘securities contract’ for the same reason.)” H.R. REP. NO. 109‐31,
supra note 14, at 128. Although the foregoing statement suggests otherwise, an opening clause has
not yet been added to the definition of “repurchase agreement.” See BAPCPA, § 907(a)(1)(C) (to
be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)); 11 U.S.C. § 101(47) (2000).
49 11 U.S.C. § 741(7) (2000).
50 BAPCPA § 907(a)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)).
51 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52 BAPCPA § 907(c) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(38A)).
53 BAPCPA § 907(d)(1)(D) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(27)); id. at § 907(e)(2) (to be codified
at 11 U.S.C. § 546(j)); id. at § 907(f)(3) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2)(E)); id. at § 907(k) (to
be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 561).
54 Some netting and setoff rights, however, are limited in transactions involving commodity
brokers. See BAPCPA § 907(k)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 561(b)(2)).
55 Multi‐party netting may also find protection under the Reform Act. The Code offers limited
protection for any setoff right—regardless of whether it arises from financial contracts—provided
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In principle, the Act also retains the concept of protected parties. With
respect to forward, commodity, and securities contracts, the original Code
singled out particular parties for protection—a “commodity broker, forward
contract merchant, stockbroker, financial institution[], or securities clearing
agency.”57 The Act expands this list58 to include any counterparty that is a
“financial participant,” defined as a clearing organization or an entity that
entered protected financial transactions (swaps, repos, forwards, etc.) worth at
least $1 billion in notional value (or $100 million in mark‐to‐market value) at
some point during the preceding 15 months.59 In effect, the Code now exempts
“sophisticated” financial participants from the reach of the automatic stay and
other provisions.60

it involves the setoff of a “mutual debt” owed to the debtor against a claim owed by the debtor.
BAPCPA § 907(n) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 553(a)); 11 U.S.C. § 553(a) (2000). Although not
defined in the Code, “mutuality” is thought to require at least that the party indebted to the
debtor is the same party holding a claim against the debtor. See generally Rhett Campbell, Energy
Future and Forward Contracts, Safe Harbors and the Bankruptcy Code, 78 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 26–29
(2004). Put differently, “mutuality” may not be satisfied if the claim is held by a creditor but the
debt is owed by a subsidiary or affiliate of the creditor. Mutuality would, of course, be satisfied if
the subsidiary or affiliate transferred its debt to the creditor, provided the transfer did not occur
within 90 days of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing. BAPCPA § 907(n) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
553(a)(2)). Prior to the Reform Act, it was uncertain whether this 90‐day “mini‐preference” rule
applied to protected financial contracts. Campbell, supra, at 26‐29. Some of this uncertainty is
resolved by the Reform Act, which explicitly protects rights of setoff under protected financial
contracts that were acquired by a protected counterparty at any time prior to the debtor’s
bankruptcy filings. BAPCPA § 907(n) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 553(a)(2)(B)(ii), (3)(C)). Now
affiliates can transfer claims or obligations to each other and then subtract the aggregate value of
their claims against the debtor from the total amount of their obligations to the debtor, effectively
exercising multi‐party close‐out netting.
56 See notes 38–40, supra, and accompanying text.
57 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b)(6), 555, 556 (2000).
58 Additional, small changes are made to the definitions of “financial institution” (which now
includes federally‐insured credit unions) and “forward contract merchant” (now includes Federal
reserve banks). See BAPCPA §§ 907(b)(1), (3) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C § 101(22), (26)).
59 BAPCPA § 907(b)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(22A)).
60 Interestingly, the term “financial participant” has also been added to sections 362(b)(17) and
546(g), which offer safe harbors for pre‐petition transfers and in‐bankruptcy setoffs by “a swap
participant or financial participant.” BAPCPA § 907(d)(1)(c), (e)(1)(c) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§
362(b)(17), 546(g)) (emphasis added). Why add “financial participant” when the definition of
“swap participant” already encompasses any entity that “has an outstanding swap agreement
with the debtor?” The legislative materials explain that the addition was thought helpful in
ensuring protection for clearing organizations (a type of “financial participant” listed in BAPCPA
§907(b)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C § 101(22A)(B)), which may receive or deliver payments
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Based on these and other amendments, 61 it would seem that the Reform
Act merely builds upon the Code’s existing tripartite structure for financial
contracts—the scope of protected contracts is enlarged, the number of protected
parties is increased, and the range of protected contractual rights is broadened.
This impression, we believe, is somewhat misleading. For a large proportion of
financial contracts, the tripartite structure has been dismantled.
This is the product of massive changes to the definition of “swap
agreement.” Old section 101(53B) defined it as a swap involving currencies,
interest rates, commodities, or “any other similar agreement,” including “any
combination of” or “master agreement for” such agreements.62 The newly
amended definition covers these transactions as well as options, forwards, and
futures involving the same subject matter.63 Additionally, a “swap agreement”
now includes swaps, options, forwards, and futures on debt64 or equity65 and
various other derivative products, such as credit swaps,66 total return swaps, 67
and weather options.68 And there is the familiar opening clause,69 making clear
that nearly all “similar” agreements are covered as well.70
under a swap agreement even though it is not formally a party to the agreement. See H.R. REP.
NO. 109‐31, supra note 14, at 131.
61 Several other changes are notable. One makes clear that a swap counterparty can set off its own
obligations to the debtor against any collateral securing the swap agreement, including collateral
pledged by the debtor but held by the debtor itself (e.g., receivables) or by third parties (e.g.,
resold securities). BAPCPA § 907(d)(1)(C) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(17)); H.R. REP. NO.
109‐31, supra note 14, at 132. Another amendment makes clear that the financial‐contract safe
harbors extend to pre‐petition attachment of or foreclosure on debtor property by a swap
counterparty. BAPCPA § 907(e)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 546(g)). Previous case law had
reached the opposite conclusion. See, e.g., In re Interbulk, 240 B.R. 195, 201–03 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1999). Other amendments replace terms such as “liquidation” and “termination” with the phrase
“liquidation, termination, or acceleration” in various sections, thereby clarifying the range of
contractual rights exempt from the prohibition on ipso facto clauses. See, e.g., BAPCPA §
907(g)(2), (h)(2), (i)(2), (j)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 555, 556, 559, 560). Finally, the Reform
Act adds a new damages calculation provision. Id. at § 910 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 562).
62 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B) (2000).
63 BAPCPA § 907(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C § 101(53B)(A)(i)(I)–(III)).
64 Id. at § 907(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C § 101(53B)(A)(i)(V)).
65 Id. at § 907(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C § 101(53B)(A)(i)(IV)).
66 Id. at § 907(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C § 101(53B)(A)(i)(VI)).
67 Id.
68 Id. at § 907(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B)(A)(i)(VIII)).
69 BAPCPA § 907(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B)(A)(ii)).
70 We say “nearly all” because the opening clause applies to “forward, swap, future, or option”
agreements that (I) have been, are now, or become “subject of recurrent trading in the swap
markets” and (II) are written on “one or more rates, currencies, commodities, equity securities, . .
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These amendments do much more than simply expand the list of
protected swaps. They expand it to include virtually every contract traded in
derivatives markets, including particular contracts—options,71 forwards,72 and
certain futures73—that are given more limited protection elsewhere in the Code.74
It is difficult to imagine a derivative that would not be encompassed by section
101(53B). Equally important, these amendments also extend the Code’s
protections to every counterparty to a derivative contract because the definition of
“swap participant” remains unchanged. It continues to encompass any entity that
“at any time before the filing of the petition, has an outstanding swap agreement
with the debtor.”75 As a result, the amendments to “swap agreement,” move the
Code from protecting particular parties (to forwards and commodity contracts)
to protecting entire derivatives markets.
This shift in the Code effectively eliminates the concept of protected parties
with respect to forwards and commodity contracts. Any counterparty to these
contracts is a “swap participant” and therefore protected.76 This conclusion
creates no tension with the various provisions—362(b)(6), 546(e), and 556—that
permit only certain parties to forward and commodity contracts to enjoy the
Code’s safe harbors. These provisions protect particular parties, but they do not
. debt securities . . . , quantitative measures associated with an occurrence . . . , or economic or
financial indices . . . .” Id.
71 See, e.g., id. at § 907(a)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(i)) (defining “securities
contract” to include options on protected securities contracts); id. at § 907(a)(2) (to be codified at
11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(ii)) (including exchange‐traded options on foreign currencies); id. at §
907(a)(3) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 761(4)(E)) (including commodity options within definition
of commodity contract).
72 Id. at § 907(a)(1)(A) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)) (defining forward contract as “a
contract (other than a commodity contract) for the purchase, sale, or transfer of a commodity.”).
73 Some futures are covered by the definition of “commodity contract.” Id. at § 907(a)(1)(A) (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 761(4)); 11 U.S.C. § 761(4) (2000); see, e.g., In re Olympic Natural Gas Co.,
294 F.3d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 2002) (explaining definition of “commodity contract” includes on‐
exchange‐traded futures transactions).
74 Nearly all derivatives contracts can be reduced to combinations of options, forwards, and
swaps. See, e.g., Norman M. Feder, Deconstructing Over‐The‐Counter Derivatives, 2002 COLUM. BUS.
L. REV. 677, 691 n.24.
75 11 U.S.C. § 101(53C) (2000).
76 Thus, producers (e.g., oil companies) and end‐users that enter forward contracts should now
enjoy the same protections as brokers, banks, and other “protected parties.” A largely opposite
conclusion was reached under the pre‐2005 Code. See, e.g., Mirant Americas Energy Mktg. v.
Kern Oil & Ref. Co. (In re Mirant Corp.), 310 B.R. 548, 570 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2004) (finding that
protection as “forward contract merchant” requires to “have entered into the Agreements as a
participant seeking profit in the forward contract trade” under sections 362(b)(6) and 556, and not
“for its own consumption or as a producer”).
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rule out safe harbors for other counterparties under other provisions of the Code.
Indeed, courts have long recognized significant overlap in the Code’s
definitions,77 and Congress was fully aware that the new definition of “swap
agreement” would cover all forwards.78 Indeed, legislative history indicates that
Congress was aware that all of the Code’s definitions overlap considerably.79
II.

What are the Boundaries of the New Code?

A principal goal of the Act, then, is to expand dramatically the range of
protected financial contracts. Entire derivatives markets are now protected. The
Act achieves this goal primarily through definitions that are simply long lists of
financial products observed (now or in the future) in financial markets. The
virtue of this formalistic approach is that it leaves little doubt about the Code’s
boundaries: any transaction that bears the formal markings of a swap, repo,
forward, commodity contract, or securities contract is protected. It is largely
unnecessary for judges to analyze the economics of particular transactions.
But the Act’s simplicity comes with a price: as it extends the range of
protected contracts, it may encompass transactions lying on the boundary
between financial contracts and ordinary loans. Many financial contracts have a
credit component; one party temporarily extends credit to the other. Sometimes,
this component is even the dominant or exclusive feature of the transaction, as in
repos and other transactions that combine multiple financial contracts (e.g.,
securities purchases and forwards) and, in doing so, replicate an ordinary loan.
Prior to the Reform Act, judges sometimes analyzed the economics of the
transaction and attempted to draw lines between true financial contracts and
ordinary loans. Is there any room for such line drawing now? We address this
question in Section II.A.
See, e.g., Hamilton Taft & Co. v. Howard, Weil, Labouisse, Freidrichs, Inc. (In re Hamilton Taft
& Co.), 114 F.3d 991, 992 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding overlap between section 546(f) and 546(e) and
holding that sections meant to augment each other).
78 H.R. REP. NO. 109‐31, supra note 14, at 129 (“The use of the term ‘forward’ in the definition of
‘swap agreement’ is not intended to refer only to transactions that fall within the definition of
‘forward contract.’ Instead, a ‘forward’ transaction could be a ‘swap agreement’ even if not a
‘forward contract.’”).
79 H.R. REP. NO. 109‐31, supra note 14, at 131 explains:
The definition of ‘financial participant’ (as with the other provisions of the Code
relating to ‘securities contracts,’ ‘forward contracts,’ ‘commodity contracts,’
‘repurchase agreements,’ and ‘swap agreements’) is not mutually exclusive, i.e.,
an entity that qualifies as a ‘financial participant’ could also be a ‘swap
participant,’ ‘repo participant,’ ‘forward contract merchant,’ ‘commodity broker,’
‘stockbroker,’ ‘securities clearing agency,’ and/or ‘financial institution.’
77
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The Code’s protections may also capture “settlement payments” that are,
in essence, preferential or fraudulent transfers to preexisting creditors and
equityholders. This is most likely to occur in the context of financial transactions
involving the debtor’s own securities—stock, commercial paper, or other debt
issued by the debtor. In transactions such as these, the counterparty is typically
wearing two hats—it is, at the same time, party to a financial contract as well as
one of the debtor’s creditors or equityholders. This may occur when stockholders
tender their shares in an LBO, when a debtor repurchases its stock via forward
contracts, or when the debtor repurchases its commercial paper prior to
maturity. In each case, the payments are simultaneously “settlement payments”
to a counterparty and dividends to a shareholder (in the case of equity
repurchases) or early repayments to a creditor (in the case of debt repurchases).
This is potentially problematic when the settlement payments occur within the
lookback periods for fraudulent conveyances80 and preferential transfers.81 An
eve‐of‐bankruptcy settlement payment to a financial counterparty may be
nothing more than an eve‐of‐bankruptcy dividend to a stockholder or preference
to a creditor. Is there any room here for line‐drawing by bankruptcy judges? We
address this question in Section II.B.
A. Financial Contracts versus Ordinary Loans
An ordinary loan can be replicated by a combination of financial contracts.
Simple economic theory—“put‐call parity”—tells us as much.82 Consider, for
example, a simple forward in which Party A agrees to purchase a security one
year hence from Party B for $105. The transaction enables Party A, at a price, to
take on the risk (upside and down) associated with the price of the security. Now
assume that, at the same time the parties execute the forward, they enter another
contract: Party A sells the same or same type of security to Party B today at the
current market price, say, $100. The net result of these two transactions is a loan:
A receives $100 today (under the second contract), which it will repay with $5

Id. at § 1402 (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)) (permitting avoidance of fraudulent
transfers or obligations “made or incurred on or within 2 years before the date of the filing of the
petition”); see also 11 U.S.C. § 544(b)(1) (permitting avoidance of certain transfers that are
“voidable under applicable law,” including non‐bankruptcy fraudulent conveyance laws, which
have varying statutes of limitations).
81 BAPCPA § 1213(a)(1) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)) (permitting avoidance of preferential
transfers that were made “on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition” or
“between ninety days and one year before the date of the filing of the petition, if such creditor at
the time of such transfer was an insider”).
82 See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Financial Contract Innovation and Income Tax Policy, 107 HARV. L. REV.
460, 466 n.27 (1993).
80
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interest next year (under the first contract). Both contracts do indeed involve the
sale of a security, but does this matter? No. In the first transaction, Party A takes
on the risk of the underlying security; in the second, it disposes of that risk. Both
transactions occur simultaneously, meaning that Party A never takes an
economic interest in the security. All that remains is a loan from Party B to Party
A, secured by temporary ownership of the security transferred to Party B.83
The first transaction (the forward) is undoubtedly a protected transaction
under the Code. So is the second. Is the combination also protected, even if it is
equivalent to an ordinary loan? It would certainly seem so, because the
combination is essentially what market participants call a repurchase agreement
or repo.84 Some repos—those in which the underlying security is a T‐Bill or other
qualified security—have been explicitly protected by the Code since 1984.85 But
what about other kinds of repos, such as those involving mortgage‐backed
securities or stock? Are they protected transactions (they are undoubtedly
contracts “for the purchase, sale, or loan of a security”86) or are they unprotected
secured loans? Prior to 2005, this was a hard question. At least one court, in
Criimi Mae,87 was unwilling to conclude, without an evidentiary hearing, that the
repo in question involved a transfer of ownership and hence a sale of securities.
But the repo at issue in Criimi Mae, notwithstanding some non‐standard

Formally, there is of course a difference from a secured loan, as Party B becomes the owner of
the security and is, in most cases, free to dispose of it. This is akin, but not identical, to a security
interest in the security. See In re Criimi Mae, Inc., 251 B.R. 796, 801 (Bankr. D. Md. 2000) (“One
essential difference in the rights of a transferee under a true sale, as opposed to the transferee of a
lien, is the right of the transferee to dispose of the securities and otherwise to deal with the
securities as the absolute property of the transferee during the pendency of the
repurchase/repayment obligation under the contract”).
84 JOHN C. HULL, OPTIONS, FUTURES, AND OTHER DERIVATIVES 94 (5th ed. 2003).
85 See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
86 See 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(i) (2000). This is plain when the repo is decomposed into its
constituent parts—a securities contract and a forward.
87 251 B.R. at 805. Criimi Mae “sent shockwaves through the financial industry.” Jeanne L.
Schroeder, A Repo Opera: How Criimi Mae Got Repos Backwards, 76 AM BANKR. L.J. 565, 567 (2002).
Other courts have respected the parties’ decision to structure transactions as a repo instead of a
secured loan. See In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman Asset Mgmt. Corp., 67 B.R. 557, 598 (Bankr. D.
N.J. 1986) (noting “mere presence of secured loan characteristics in repo and reverse repo
agreement” not enough to preclude decision to structure transactions as purchases and sales); see
also Jeanne L. Schroeder, Repo Madness: The Characterization of Repurchase Agreements under the
Bankruptcy Code and the U.C.C., 46 SYRACUSE L. REV. 999, 1010–17 (1996) (analyzing case law prior
to Criimi Mae); Harold S. Novikoff, (Re)Characterization in Bankruptcy of Transactions Affecting the
Public Markets: The Treatment of Repurchase Agreements and its Implications, SK092 ALI‐ABA 237
(2004) [hereinafter Novikoff] (analyzing Criimi Mae and other case law regarding repos).
83
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provisions,88 was economically equivalent to the “repurchase agreements”
explicitly protected by the Code. If that repo had an uncertain status under the
pre‐2005 Code, what was the status of any other combination of financial
contracts that is functionally equivalent to a loan? And if a court “must examine
the substantive provisions of the contract,”89 what conclusion would it reach? A
repo—even one protected by the Code—is as much a loan as a financial
contract.90
Some of these questions are explicitly addressed by the Reform Act. All
repos, including those at issue in Criimi Mae, are now explicitly covered by the
definition of “securities contract.”91 This amendment, the legislative history
makes clear, is meant to “eliminate any inquiry under section 555 and related
provisions as to whether a repurchase or reverse repurchase transaction is a
purchase and sale transaction or a secured financing.”92
But other combinations of financial contracts are not explicitly addressed
by the Act. The possibilities are endless. A total return swap, combined with a
securities purchase, achieves the same effect as a repo: it is economically
equivalent to a loan.93 Or consider a variant on the “prepay” transactions at issue
See Novikoff, supra note 87, at 249 (noting Criimi Mae court was particularly impressed by “the
(non‐standard) requirement that the repo buyer sell back the identical securities to the repo
seller”).
89 Criimi Mae, 251 B.R. at 802.
90 See Granite Partners L.P. v. Bear, Sterns & Co., 17 F.Supp.2d 275, 301 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), explaining
that, in a repo,:
[t]he sellerʹs interest in the market value of the securities is no greater in a
secured loan transaction where he retains beneficial ownership of the securities
than in a purchase and sale transaction where he is contractually bound to
reacquire ownership of them. Clearly, any attempt to determine whether a repo
or reverse repo transaction is more like a secured loan than a purchase and sale
by weighing economic factors on a finely tuned balance scale would be an
essentially formalistic and ultimately unproductive exercise.
See also Novikoff, supra note 87, at 242 (noting that repos and reverse repos are hybrid
transactions, which appear, as an economic matter, similar to loans secured by repo securities).
91 BAPCPA § 907(a)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(i)).
92 H.R. REP NO. 109‐31, supra note 14, at 130 (emphasis added).
93 See, e.g., David Z. Nirenberg & Steven L. Kopp, Credit Derivatives: Tax Treatment of Total Return
Swaps, Default Swaps, and Credit‐Linked Notes, 87 J. TAX’N 82, 83 (1997):
A total return swap sometimes is used to achieve off‐balance‐sheet financing of a
reference security. In that event, the would‐be borrower (the total return
receiver) sells the reference security to a purchaser and at the same time enters
into a total return swap with the purchaser (the total return payer) under which
the would‐be borrower receives the total return on that security. The two
88
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in Enron’s bankruptcy.94 Party A agrees to pay $105 for delivery of one unit of a
commodity (say, oil) one year hence. Party A will pay when Party B delivers the
commodity. Suppose, in addition, that the parties simultaneously enter a
“prepaid” forward contract in which Party B agrees to pay $100 today for
delivery of one unit of the same commodity next year. This is a “prepaid”
forward because Party B tenders payment today, not when the commodity is
delivered.95 As in a repo, the net effect of these two transactions is a loan: Party A
receives $100 today, which will be repaid with interest next year ($105). And, as
in repos, Party A bears none of the economic risk surrounding the market price
of the underlying commodity: it assumes the risk in one transaction and
surrenders it in the other.
Does the Code offer a safe harbor for combinations such as these? Absent
badges of fraud, it appears to do so. A combination of financial contracts, even
one that mimics a loan, merits protection if the underlying contracts fall within
formal categories explicitly protected by the Code. This follows directly from the
text of the new Code. It protects not only any transaction that a market
participant would call a “swap,” “repo,” “forward,” “commodity contract,” or
“securities contract,” 96 but also any combination of such transactions. No

transactions taken together are economically equivalent to the seller retaining
ownership of the reference security and borrowing what are nominally the
proceeds of the sale of the security from the purchaser.
94 See Second Interim Report of Neil Batson, Court‐Appointed Examiner, Case No. 01‐16034, at 58
(Jan. 21, 2003), available at
http://www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/InterimReport2ofExaminer.pdf (examining
Enron’s prepay transactions).
95 This feature, in itself, is not unusual. Prepaid forward transactions are part and parcel of the
forward markets. See, e.g., David M. Schizer, Balance in the Taxation of Derivative Securities: An
Agenda for Reform, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1886, 1901–03 (2004) (identifying various common
derivative transactions, including prepaid forwards).
96 The Code defines none of these terms; judges must turn to the market and rely upon industry
definitions. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. Indeed, this type of analysis—
characterizing transactions based on industry custom—is explicitly advocated by the opening
clause in the definition of “swap agreement.” BAPCPA § 907(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §
101(53B)(ii)). Instead of simply protecting any “transaction that is similar to” others explicitly
listed in other subsections, the clause protects a “similar” transaction if and only if it (I) “is of a
type that has been, is presently, or in the future becomes the subject of recurrent dealings in the
swap markets” and (II) “is a forward, swap, future, or option on one or more rates,” or one of
several other types of transactions. Id. Judges, then, are directed to characterize similar
transactions based on (I) their commonality in the marketplace and (II) whether a market
participant would call them a “forward, swap, future” or other listed transaction.
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exception is made for combinations that, in effect, resemble a loan.97 Additional
support for this conclusion can be found in the new definition of “securities
contract,” in section 741(7).98 It extends protection to “any other agreement or
transaction that is similar to”99 those mentioned elsewhere in the definition,
including “repurchase or reverse repurchase transactions.”100 Thus, a
combination of agreements that resembles a repo would seem to merit
protection, even if it exhibits loan‐like features.101
The new Code, in other words, places form over substance in characterizing
protected transactions. A combination of contracts merits protection—regardless
of its underlying economics—if the contracts are commonly recognized in the
marketplace as swaps, forwards, or another type of contract protected by the
Code. Indeed, margin loans—loans secured by the debtor’s securities portfolio—
are now explicitly protected even though they are, in form and in substance,
simply loans.102 To boot, the Act significantly restricts the equitable powers of
bankruptcy courts. Section 362(o) now emphasizes that a counterparty’s setoff
rights “shall not be stayed by any order of a court or administrative agency in
any proceeding under this title.”103 Similar language was already part of sections
555, 556, 559 and 560 prior to the Reform Act.104
This emphasis on form‐over‐substance is evident in the legislative history
as well. Protection for repos was added in order to prevent “any inquiry” into

See BAPCPA § 907(a)(1)(A) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(25)(B)); id. at § 907(a)(1)(C) (to be
codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(47)(A)); id. at § 907(a)(1)(E) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 101(53B)(A));
id. at § 907(a)(2) (to be codified at § 741(7)(A)); id. at § 907(a)(3) (to be codified at § 761(4)). Thus, a
combination of prepaid and postpaid commodity forwards would seem to merit protection,
because it is a combination of “commodity forwards” expressly included in the definition of
swap agreements.
98 BAPCPA § 907(a)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)).
99 Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(v)).
100 Id. (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(i)).
101 We recognize that our analysis may raise some eyebrows. It might be argued that the Act
protects combinations of contracts if, and only if, the combinations themselves (not just the
component contracts) are recognized in the financial markets. Thus, repos merit protection, but the
“prepay” structures used by Enron do not. This argument, however, finds no support in the Act
or its legislative history.
102 BAPCPA § 907(a)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 741(7)(A)(iv)).
103 Id. at § 907(d)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(o)).
104 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 560 (2000) (declaring swap participant’s contractual right to liquidate,
terminate, or accelerate agreement “shall not be stayed, avoided or otherwise limited by
operation of any provision of this title or by order of a court or administrative agency in any
proceeding under this title.”).
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the economics of the transaction.105 If transactions in one legal category (loans)
can be replicated by transactions in another (combinations of financial contracts),
there is little courts can do to distinguish them. The virtue of the Reform Act is
that it gets judges out of the business of trying to.
The legislative history, to be sure, contains multiple warnings that the
Code’s protections should not shelter ordinary commercial transactions. The new
“definition of ‘swap agreement,’” for example,
“should not be interpreted to permit parties to document non‐swaps as
swap transactions. Traditional commercial arrangements, such as supply
agreements, or other non‐financial market transactions, such as
commercial, residential or consumer loans, cannot be treated as ‘swaps’
under … the Bankruptcy Code simply because the parties purport to
document or label the transactions as ‘swap agreements.’”106
Similarly, “the inclusion of ‘margin loans’ in the definition [of securities contract]
is intended to encompass only those loans commonly known in the securities
industry as ‘margin loans,’ …. ‘Margin loans’ do not include, however, other loans
that happen to be secured by securities collateral.” 107 These warnings, however,
only underscore the importance of industry custom. A commercial loan that “the
parties purport to document or label” as a “swap agreement” will not be
recognized as a swap in the marketplace, especially if it involves an exchange of
principal.108 Only transactions that are “commonly known” or “subject to
recurrent dealings” in the relevant market merit protection.
Our discussion so far has assumed the absence of any badges of fraud. A
transaction designed to defraud creditors should, of course, receive no safe
harbor under the Code. If a combination of prepaid and postpaid forwards was
used to manipulate financial reports (as allegedly it was in Enron109), it would be
H.R. REP NO. 109‐31, supra note 14, at 130.
Id. at 129 (emphasis supplied).
107 Id. at 119 (emphasis supplied).
108 A hallmark of almost all swaps is the absence of an exchange of principal: the parties instead
exchange cash flows calculated on the basis of a “notional” principal amount. See, e.g., Thrifty Oil
Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Savs. Ass’n, 322 F.3d 1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining
notional amount “provides the basis for calculating payment obligations but does not change
hands.”); see also Mount Lucas Assocs., Inc. v. MG Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 14, 18 n.1 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1998) (stating in most swaps, with exception of currency swaps, notional amount does
not change hands and is not at risk); Feder, supra note 74, at 702 (explaining most swaps do not
require exchange of principal).
109 Enron allegedly used the combination of prepaid and postpaid forwards to disguise loans and
inflate earnings in an effort to deceive analysts and investors. See, e.g., SEC v. J.P. Morgan Chase,
105
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nonsensical if the transaction found a safe harbor under the Code. And it would
be absurd if the trustee were unable to recover pre‐petition transfers or prevent
post‐petition exercise of termination, liquidation, and setoff rights.
The Code does indeed avoid this absurdity. Settlement payments and
other pre‐petition transfers are recoverable under section 548(a)(1)(A) if they
were made by the debtor “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud” its
creditors.110 But this provision may not go far enough. Nothing in the Code
places an explicit limit on a counterparty’s post‐petition rights (termination,
liquidation, and setoff) under a fraudulent transaction. One might be inferred
from the court’s equitable powers under section 105(a),111 but those powers are
curtailed by new section 362(o)112 and other provisions that expressly prohibit
“any order of a court” that would limit the exercise of these post‐petition rights.
113

Instead of section 548(a)(1)(A), the primary ground for policing fraudulent
transactions is, once again, industry custom.114 As several courts have noted, a
transaction bearing badges of fraud will rarely be one that a market participant
would call customary.115 This is because fraud must be concealed; otherwise it
attracts investigation. In an effort to conceal fraud, parties will resort to unusual
combinations of contracts and may rely upon “artificially” interposed parties,
SEC Litigation Release No. 18252 (July 28, 2003), available at
www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lr18252.htm.
110 BAPCPA §907(e) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 546(e), (f), (g)) (permitting avoidance under
section 548(a)(1)(A)); id. at § 907(e) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 546(j)) (permitting avoidance
under section 548(a)(1)(A)).
111 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) (2000) (permitting court to “issue any order, process, or judgment that is
necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title.”).
112 BAPCPA § 907(d)(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. 362(o)).
113 See id. at § 907(j) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 560); see also supra note 92 and accompanying
text.
114 Non‐bankruptcy law may be another important ground. The Code’s protections extend, of
course, only to enforceable transactions. A fraudulent transaction may be one that is void under
state law. See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 323 B.R. 857, 877–78 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing how
pre‐petition transfers to counterparty are not protected if transaction itself was void under
relevant state law).
115 See, e.g., Kipperman v. Circle Trust (In re Grafton Partners), 321 B.R. 527, 540 (B.A.P. 9th Cir.
2005) (finding pre‐petition transfers arising from fraudulent transactions not protected
“settlement payments” because not “commonly used in the securities trade”); Jackson v. Mishkin
(In re Adler, Coleman Clearing Corp.), 263 B.R. 406, 481 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (concluding that fake
purchases and short sales, designed to defraud debtor and its creditors, were so steeped in fraud
that they “could not be considered as contemplating a normal ‘completion of a securities
transaction’ as commonly understood in the securities industry”).
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both of which will render a financial transaction atypical, as the convoluted
prepay transactions in Enron illustrate.116 Industry custom, then, is a benchmark
for characterizing any financial transaction, even one bearing badges of fraud.
B. Settlement Payments versus Voidable Transfers
Industry custom may not go far enough. Custom is useful for identifying
transactions that fit within a category of protected contracts, but it pays little
attention to the identities of the counterparties or the nature of the securities
underlying the contracts. A contract to purchase equity or debt securities can,
undoubtedly, be a protected transaction. It might take the form of an open‐
market repurchase of equity or commercial paper (falling into the definition of
“securities contract”) or a derivative transaction such as an equity forward
(qualifying as a “swap agreement”). But what if the underlying securities were
issued by the debtor and the repurchase occurred within ninety days (in the case
of debt repurchases) or two years (in the case of equity repurchases) of its
bankruptcy filing?117 Formally, the payments are simply “settlement payments”
or “transfers” under a protected financial contract. In substance, however, the
payments are pre‐petition payments to equityholders or debtholders; a
repurchase of equity may be little more than a dividend and a repurchase of
commercial paper may just be a preferential transfer.
The tension here is between the Code’s protections for financial contracts
and its efforts to protect creditors’ rights generally, as reflected in rules limiting
preferential and fraudulent transfers. In some respects, this tension is precisely
the point of the Code’s financial contracts provisions: counterparties are given
special treatment—treatment unavailable to general creditors and counterparties
to executory contracts—because their claims raise distinct public policy concerns
(nonpayment might contribute to systemic risk in the financial markets).118 But a
different kind of tension arises when counterparties are not merely signatories to
a financial transaction. When a counterparty is both signatory to a financial

In Enron’s case, the “prepay transactions” were more complicated than the one illustrated
above. Most importantly, to disguise the offsetting nature of its trades, Enron included third
parties, effectively turning the two‐party commodity forwards into circular three (or more) party
arrangements. See In re Enron Corp., No. 01‐16034 at 58–59 (Second Interim Report of Neil Batson,
Court‐Appointed Examiner 2003), available at
www.enron.com/corp/por/pdfs/examiner2/InterimReport2ofExaminer.pdf (describing Enron
prepay transactions as in “substance debt, funded by either large financial institutions or
institutional investors”).
117 See supra notes 80‐81 and accompanying text.
118 See supra notes 9–14 and accompanying text.
116
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contract and holder of debtor‐issued securities on which the contract is written,
the Code’s financial‐contract protections are doing double‐duty. They are
protecting settlement of a financial contract as well as payment of the claims or
interests underlying that contract (that is, payment of debts to creditors or
repurchase of stock from shareholders). The former protection is entirely
consistent with the protection of financial contracts. The latter may be
inconsistent with the protection of creditor’s rights generally, particularly if it
allows a preexisting creditor or equity holder to improve its position in
bankruptcy merely by executing a pre‐petition financial contract.119
If the counterparty acted “with actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud”
the debtor’s other creditors, a judge can unwind any settlement payments. 120 But
evidence of such fraud is rare. There are many legitimate reasons for “issuer‐
related” transactions involving the debtor’s own securities. Consider, for
example, an LBO, a common going‐private transaction121 in which a company
may use borrowed funds, typically secured debt, to repurchase its equity.122 The
transaction may serve valid business purposes, but it can reorder priorities. At
the end of the LBO, equityholders will have received payment and the firm taken
The “double‐duty” problem can arise in other contexts as well. A claim for damages under an
interest rate swap is ordinarily an allowed claim. But the swap may allow a creditor to recover
amounts which, under a loan agreement, would potentially qualify as unmatured interest.
Suppose Creditor extends a variable‐rate loan to Debtor. At the same time, the parties enter an
interest rate swap, effectively converting the variable rate loan into a fixed rate loan. If the debtor
subsequently becomes insolvent and enters bankruptcy, Creditor will receive a claim for
termination damages (if any) under the swap agreement. Had the parties instead entered into a
fixed rate loan directly, similar termination damages would not have been allowed under 11
U.S.C. § 502(b)(2) (2000) to the extent they compensated Creditor for unmatured interest under
the loan agreement. See, e.g., Thrifty Oil Co. v. Bank of Am. Nat’l Trust and Savs. Ass’n, 322 F.3d
1039, 1052 (9th Cir. 2002) (acknowledging the “speculative possibility that a lender could use
interest rate swaps to evade Section 502(b)(2),” but concluding that “where the lender provides a
standard interest rate swap to a sophisticated borrower and the swap serves a legitimate non‐
bankruptcy purpose, the lenderʹs claim for termination damages is, for all purposes,
indistinguishable from a claim filed by a non‐lending swap dealer. Allowing the lender to collect
termination damages in such a case offends none of the principles and policies of Section
502(b)(2).”).
120 BAPCPA § 1402(1)‐(2) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(A)).
121 A leveraged buyout is a corporate takeover strategy, typically involving repurchase (via tender
offer) of the firm’s equity using borrowed funds. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE
LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS 399–401, 406–15 (2d ed. 1995); see also David
Gray Carlson, Leveraged Buyouts in Bankruptcy, 20 GA. L. REV. 73, 74 (1985) (defining and further
discussing LBO’s).
122 See Carlson, supra note121, at 74 (explaining LBO may involve purchase of target corporation’s
assets or merger of target corporation with newly created entity).
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on significant secured debt, all to the disadvantage of unsecured creditors if the
company finds itself in bankruptcy soon after.123 Or consider a stock buy‐back
program, which may be implemented when managers believe the debtor’s stock
is undervalued or when they hope (as Enron’s management purportedly hoped)
to hedge dilution of earnings resulting from employee stock option programs.124
Again priorities can be reordered: the buy‐back transfers a firm’s assets to its
equityholders, to the disadvantage of creditors if the firm enters bankruptcy soon
after. Yet another example is a debtor’s decision to repurchase large amounts of
its commercial paper prior to maturity and at a premium over the market
price?125 The repurchase may occur on the eve of bankruptcy. But instead of
seeking to favor certain creditors and defraud others, the firm may have
repurchased the commercial paper simply to preserve its own credit rating.126
The reordering of priorities may be more troubling in some cases than
others. It is perhaps most troubling when the counterparty to the financial
contract was one of the debtor’s creditors or equityholders prior to entering into
the contract. This type of transaction is exemplified by Enron’s early repurchase
of outstanding commercial paper.127 In it, preexisting claimants may have gained
Official Comm. Of Unsecured Creditors v. Fleet Retail Fin. Group (In re Hechinger Inv. Co. of
Del.), 274 B.R. 71, 81 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (“[T]he former shareholders of the acquired company
are replaced by secured creditors . . . However, when the amount of debt incurred proves too
much and the leveraged company collapses into bankruptcy, the downside risk caused by the
increased debt to equity ratio is borne primarily by the unsecured creditors.”).
124 See Harrison J. Goldin, Court‐Appointed Examiner in the Enron North America Corp.
Bankruptcy Proceeding, Report Respecting his Investigation of the Role of Certain Entities in
Transactions Pertaining to Special Purpose Entities, Nov. 14, 2003, p. 179 at n. 498 (“Like many
companies, Enron utilized hedging of its [employee stock ownership program] to avoid potential
dilution of its earnings.”); see also In re Enron Corp., 323 B.R. 857 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(addressing the equity forward transactions executed by Enron in the context of hedging
activities).
125 See In re Enron Corp., 325 B.R. 671, 685 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing repurchases by
Enron of outstanding commercial paper prior to maturity, and noting that the price paid was
allegedly much greater than the commercial paper’s market value).
126 See e.g., In re Prima Co., 98 F.2d 952, 968 (7th Cir. 1938) (establishing soundness of repurchase
and finding no fraud in repurchase even when “a few” of the notes outstanding are paid before
they are due).
127 See In re Enron Corp., 325 B.R. 671 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005). There the court denied a motion to
dismiss by J.P. Morgan and other defendants, to whom Enron had made prepetition transfers of
over $1 billion in prepayment of commercial paper. The defendants argued that these transfers
were “settlement payments” protected by the Code’s safe harbors. The court denied the
defendant’s motion, concluding that “because the § 546(e) safe harbor only protects from
avoidance those settlement payments that are ‘commonly used in the securities trade’ and
because, on a motion to dismiss, the Court must accept Enronʹs allegations as true, evidence must
123
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a safe exit from an ailing company by virtue of the safe harbors for financial
contracts. Less troubling, perhaps, are cases where financial counterparties
become claimants (most likely shareholders) at the time of or after entering the
financial contract in an effort to hedge their exposure under the contract. This is
often the case in stock buy‐backs: the debtor may enter equity forward
transactions with a financial institution, which hedges its exposure by
immediately purchasing shares of the debtor’s equity.128 These transactions are
less troublesome because they don’t function, at least as far as the counterparties
to such derivatives are concerned, as a “safe exit” strategy for pre‐existing
creditors and shareholders. Counterparties become equityholders simply to
hedge the risk underlying the contract itself.129
Do these transactions merit the same protection as financial contracts that
achieve no similar reordering of priorities? Does the Code give judges room to
distinguish transactions that function as a “safe exit” from those that reflect
common hedging strategies? The answer to both questions, we believe, is no. The
Code offers no cues that judges should vary its protections based on either the
kind of underlying security (the debtor’s own securities or something else) or the
counterparty’s parallel role as a claimant or equityholder of the debtor. To the
contrary, the Reform Act remains silent on these oft‐litigated issues. At the same
time, the Act extends protection to the entire derivatives market and a broad
range of securities contracts and repos. Nowhere are judges asked to distinguish
transactions based on their subject matter. Protection is extended to any “margin
payment” or “settlement payment” under a securities contract or repo and to any
“transfer” under a derivative contract—with only one limitation, for cases
involving intent to defraud creditors.130 Issuer‐related transactions are singled

be presented as to whether payments made with respect to short‐term commercial paper prior to
the maturity date, at significantly above market prices and contrary to the offering documents in
the midst of coercion by the holders of the commercial paper resulting from public
announcements that make clear that the company is in a severe financial crisis constitute
settlement payments commonly used in the securities trade.” Id., at 685‐86.
128 See, e.g., Enron Corp., 323 B.R. at 860 (explaining Bear Stearns, as counterparty, “purchased
Enron stock from third parties to hedge its contractual obligation to Enron.”).
129 Transactions on the other extreme—in which counterparties do not hedge and thus never
become claimants of the debtor—may also prove troublesome. One could imagine cases in which
insiders, aware of the debtor’s financial troubles, execute equity forwards with the debtor but do
not hedge their exposure. This transaction would pay off handsomely if the debtor’s share‐price
declined significantly, as it probably would in the vicinity of bankruptcy. A massive pre‐
bankruptcy looting by insiders would result. This case, however, would seem to fall clearly
within the scope of section 548(a)(1)(A).
130 See supra note 121.
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out elsewhere in the Code, but receive no attention here.131 As long as a pre‐
petition payment fits within industry definitions of “settlement payment,”
“margin payment,” or payment “under or in connection with a swap
agreement,” it is protected from avoidance.132
This conclusion finds support in the oft‐repeated policy underlying the
Code’s safe harbors—reducing systemic risk in financial markets. That policy
would be undermined by a rule that varied the Code’s protections based on the
subject matter of the transaction. Uncertainty would surround any settlement
payment: a counterparty often deals with a broker and will be unaware whether
it is party to an issuer‐related transaction.133
Prior to the Reform Act, arguments along these lines persuaded appellate
courts that LBO payments to shareholders are “settlement payments” under the
pre‐Reform Code.134 But some bankruptcy courts135 and commentators136
See e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 510(b) (2000) (subordinating rescission and damages claims arising from
purchase or sale of debtor’s own securities); THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW 63–64 (1986) (finding traditional rationale for subordination under section
510(b) is to prevent “the buyer of a risky security [(equity)] to bootstrap himself into a less risky
class [(creditor)].”).
132 Reliance on industry definitions seems to shape the courts’ approach in dealing with some of
the dual hat problems discussed. See In re Enron Corp., 325 B.R. 671, 686 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005)
(inquiring into common usage in securities industry of repurchases of commercial paper prior to
maturity).
133 See Kaiser Steel Corp. v. Pearl Brewing Co. (In re Kaiser Steel Corp.), 952 F.2d 1230, 1241 (10th
Cir. 1991) (“disruption in the securities industry—an inevitable result if leveraged buy outs can
freely be unwound years after they occurred—is also a harm the statute was designed to avoid.”).
134 See Lowenschuss v. Resorts Int’l., Inc. (In re Resorts Int’l., Inc.), 181 F.3d 505, 516 (3d Cir. 1999)
(finding text of Code clear and concluding “[a] payment for shares during an LBO is obviously a
common securities transaction, and we therefore hold that it is also a settlement payment for the
purposes of section 546(e).”); Kaiser Steel, 952 F.2d at 1239–40 (reaching same conclusion and
citing the “the legislative intent behind § 546 to protect the nation’s financial markets from the
instability caused by the reversal of settled securities transactions”).
135 See, e.g., Wieboldt Stores v. Schottenstein, 131 B.R. 655, 662–65 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1991) (holding
LBO payments to shareholders were not “settlement payments,” even if they were delivered
through clearance and settlement system, because liquidity of market would not be affected by
judicial order requiring shareholders to return payments); see also Jackson v. Mishkin (In re Adler,
Coleman Clearing Corp.), 263 B.R. 406, 482 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (finding “no evidence . . . that any
effects of reversing the Challenged Trades would spill over beyond [the debtor] into the securities
industry to threaten the ‘ripple effect’ on other brokers and participants in the system that
concerned Congress when it enacted 546(e)”).
136 See, e.g., Gerald K. Smith & Frank R. Kennedy, Fraudulent Transfers and Obligations: Issues of
Current Interest, 43 S.C. L. REV. 709, 766 (1992) (“Neither the Bankruptcy Code provision nor a
single industry publication which any of the parties has unearthed applies the word ‘settlement’
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disagreed, reasoning that protection for LBO payments does little, if anything, to
reduce systemic risk in financial markets. As one court put it, a rule avoiding
these payments would “pose[] no significant threat to those in the clearance and
settlement chain.”137 Arguments of this sort rely exclusively on intuitions about
public policy, not on the text of the Code. This is an important point even for
non‐textualists, because the policy underlying the Code is slippery. To what
extent would stability in financial markets be affected by an amendment
eliminating any or all of the protections for financial contracts? According to one
view, not much.138 More importantly, there is little to commend a rule that varies
the Code’s protections based on (a court’s assessment of) its importance to
market stability. A rule like this is just as unpredictable as judicial inquiry into
the “substance” of a transaction—an inquiry, we have seen, that the Code
effectively rules out.139
Conclusion
The Reform Act makes many obvious changes to the Code, but its most
important contributions may be its least apparent. It plainly expands the scope of
protected transactions—swaps, forwards, commodity contracts, repos, and
securities contracts—but it does so in a way that renders the concept of
“protected parties” meaningless in the context of derivative contracts. The new
definition of “swap” is so broad that a counterparty to almost any derivative
contract—including any counterparty to a forward or commodity contract—will
find a safe harbor under the Code.
The new definitions of protected transactions contain another significant
but subtle change. These lengthy definitions—simple laundry lists of the names
of popular transactions—cabin judicial discretion in an important way. Judges
are discouraged from engaging in “substance over form” analysis. The new
to one‐time mandatory redemptions or cash mergers where corporate assets are distributed to
shareholders, rather than a market trade where shares and money are exchanged between buyers
and sellers.”) (internal citation omitted); see also Neil M. Garfinkel, No Way Out: Section 546(e) is no
Escape for the Public Shareholder of a Failed LBO, 1991 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 51, 66–67:
The inviolability of payments to shareholders is simply not basic to the operation
of the clearance and settlement systems. Those systems will be only incidentally
affected, if at all, if former shareholders are required to return payments they
received in an LBO. Neither the system of guarantees nor the solvency of
participants in the chain is threatened by a legal order in which payments to the
shareholders by their brokers are subject to recovery by a trustee in bankruptcy.
137 Wieboldt Stores, 131 B.R. at 664.
138 See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 9, at 99–106.
139 See supra Part II.A.
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definitions are pure form; they protect transactions that fit within formal
definitions developed in the marketplace. The role of the judge is to identify
these industry definitions. If the contract fits the form, it’s protected. This leads to
some concerns about overbreadth, particularly with respect to certain
transactions involving the debtor’s own securities. Absent evidence of fraud,
however, these concerns are not a problem, at least not a judge’s problem.
Nothing in the language of the Act (or the rest of the Code) limits its breadth.
Indeed the Act’s breadth is its primary virtue: little uncertainty remains about
the scope of the law or a judge’s role in applying it.
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